Date: Mar 25, 1998 [ 21: 13: 33]

Subject: DNI-NEWS Digest - 24 Mar 1998 to 25 Mar 1998 - Special issue

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Subject: DNI-NEWS Digest - 24 Mar 1998 to 25 Mar 1998 - Special issue
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There are 9 messages totalling 1258 lines in this issue.

Topics in this special issue:

1. Two New Jersey men charged in Iran arms scheme
2. fwd: namh Ayt~allh mntXry dr afSay mhajman bh mnzl aySan
3. namh~y aetraxy grvhy az ahl qlm bh Katmy
4. fwd: ktk~kary nmandgan mjls Svray aslamy dr jlsh elny mjls
5. 10 years after the ...
6. US-Iran relations: Bruce Riedel remarks on Iran at Arab-American forum
7. U.S.-Iranian Ties Slowly Improving
8. Congressional Record: The American missile protection act of 1998
9. Congressional Record: Iran's ballistic missile program

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 00:40:11 +0100
From: Farhad Abdolian <farhad@ALGONET.SE>
Subject: Two New Jersey men charged in Iran arms scheme

Two New Jersey men charged in Iran arms scheme 09:16 p.m Mar 24, 1998
Eastern

By Christine Gardner

NEWARK, N.J., March 24 (Reuters) - A New Jersey executive and a
Singapore businessman were indicted on conspiracy charges on Tuesday in
connection with an alleged attempt to sell U.S.-made missile parts to
Iran, U.S. officials said.

Daniel Malloy, 40, owner of International Helicopter, Inc of Northvale,
New Jersey, and his alleged co-conspirator, Joseph T.P. Balakrisha
Menon, 55, operator of Heli-World Aviation in Singapore, were also
charged with exporting munitions without registering with the State
Department, a U.S. attorney and U.S. Customs authorities said.

Authorities charge that the men were planning to sell Iran 20 batteries
for the AIM-54 Phoenix missile, a long-range air-to-air missile used
exclusively on F14-A fighter aircraft. Delivery was scheduled for late
last month.

Iran is the only country other than the United States that has the jets,
which Washington sold them in the late 1970s when Shah Mohamed Reza
Pahlavi was in power.

The men are charged with conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control
Act by concealing the destination of the arms parts and failing to
obtain a license to export arms on the U.S. Munitions List of the State
Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls.

The conspiracy violated the Iranian Embargo Act, which forbids sending
technology, goods and services to Iran, a country that the United States
says supports international terrorism.

In the second count, the men are alleged to have engaged in trading arms
parts in violation of the Arms Export Control Act.

The indictment superseded a March 1 federal complaint charging Malloy
with conspiracy. He is free on $2.5 million bond and is confined to his
home.

Malloy has ``substantial overseas assets,'' U.S. Attorney for New Jersey
Faith Hochberg said. She said she will ask the Singapore government to
extradite Menon to face charges.

Special agent John Varrone said an inventory of goods seized in a raid
on Malloy's company would determine the details of the shipment.

But assistant U.S. Attorney Noel Hillman said parts probably already
have reached Iranian hands.

``It's a fair assumption that there was a buying customer at the other
end who has put them to use,'' Hillman said, adding authorities are
``going to make every effort'' to track them.

The investigation began when an anonymous fax was sent to U.S. Customs'
Washington headquarters in December 1996, which said that IHI and
Heli-World were engaged in illegal exports.

Officials said hard information only points to shipment to Singapore,
not to Iran, although they suspect that was the ultimate destination.
The men engaged in a plot by fax and telephone to conceal who the
recipient of the batteries was, when to ship them to Singapore and
Menon's contacts in Iran.

The men face a maximum of five years in federal prison and a $250,000
fine on the conspiracy charge and 10 years and a $1 million fine on the
export violation count. The men have not been arraigned and no trial
date has been set, Hochberg said. REUTERS

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 01:02:20 +0100
From: Farhad Abdolian <farhad@ALGONET.SE>
Subject: fwd: namh Ayt~allh mntXry dr afSay mhajman bh mnzl aySan

=begin=
namh Ayt allh mntXry dr afSay mhajman bh mnzl aySan
------------------------------------------------------------------------
bsm allh qaCm aljbaryn -
ana llh v ana alyh rajevn
bradran v Kvahran mslman v hmvTnan ezyz
ps az slam v drvd by payan br pyambr rHmt Hxrt Katm anbya )C( v aimh
hdy bKCvC Hxrt vly eCr ejl allh tealy frjh alSryf v br hmh
pyambran alhy slam allh elyhm ajmeyn v slam v tHnyt bh Sma bradran v
Kvahran bh erx my rsand:
memvla Ayh Sryfh fvq bray aelam rHlt yk frd mslman nvSth mySvd vly
aynkh mn Anra bray Skstn Hrym qrAn v dyn v Hvzh medsh elmyh qm v
rvHanyt Syeh v mqdsat dyny v elma v bzrgan Hvzh v Hty Hrym fqh vlayt
bkar brdm.
rvz jmeh syzdhm rjb 8141 mTabq ba 32 . 8. 6731 rvz vladt ba seadt
mvly almvHdyn amyralmvmnyn elyh alslam ayn janb mTalby ra kh tZkr Anha ra
vXyfh dyny Kvd mydanstm ba mnTq ktab v snt pyambr akrm )C( v aimh
meCvmyn elyhm alslam byan krdm bh Kyal aynkh kSvr ma kSvr aslam v
paygah aimh meCvmyn elyhm alslam my baSd v Xahra Sma km v byS az
sKnan mn mTle Sdh~ayd.
ps az ayn kh bexy az rvznamh~hay mzdvr v mtmlq hmGvn sabq hr Gh
Kvastnd az thmt v ahant dryQ nkrdnd, dr rvz GharSnbh 81 rjb mTabq ba
82.8.6731 bh bhanh Hmayt az vlayt fqyh jmey az afrad by~mnTq ra bh nam
Hzb allh bh rah andaKtnd v bh zvr v thdyd v aQfal bexy az mHClyn bygnah
dbyrstanha ra hm ba Anan hmrah krdnd v xmn rah pymayy dr Kyabanhay qm Anan
ra bh Trf Hsynyh Shda v dftr ayn janb Hrkt dadnd v ba Skstn drbha v
qflha Anha ra aSQal krdnd v hrGh tvanstnd Skstnd v parh krdnd v hr Gh
Kvastnd gftnd v ahant krdnd v dr ayn myan hmkary bexy az afrad aTlaeaty
ba Hmlh knndgan bsyar mHsvs bvd. dr ayn myan aCrar daStnd bh bhanh
mHafXt az mn, mra az ataq v ktabKanh v mnzl SKCy Karj nmaynd v bbrnd v
hmh hsty mra dr aKtyar rjalh~ha v Qartgran qrar dhnd v melvm nbvd mra bh
kja myKvastnd bbrnd v hmyn by sym bh dstha Hty myKvastnd bray ayn
mnXvr drb Kanh andrvny mra ba dylm az ja bknnd ta bh mn dstrsy pyda knnd
v bh zvd bbrnd. jmey az fxla v Tlab v bradran ra bazdaSt v tlfnha ra qTe
krdnd v blndgvhay Hsynyh ra dr aKtyar grftnd v mannd lSgr mhajm pyrvz
Sdh ba Searhay anHrafy v tvhyn Amyz v bh nam Hmayt az vlayt fqyh v vly
fqyh KvdSan hr Gh Kvastnd gftnd v pKS krdnd v mvjbat naraHty hmh
hmsaygan mHtrm ra frahm nmvdnd! melvm Sd dr mnTq Aqayan vlayt fqyh yeny
Qart amval v Skstn v parh krdn ktabha v Hty qrAn krym, vlayt fqyh yeny
tCrf QaCbanh dr Kanh v mlk dygran, vlayt fqyh yeny ahant bh Hvzhhay
elmyh v elma v fqh v elm v by aHtramy bh hmh mqdsat, Kvb Sd nmrdym v
cmrh vlayt fqyh Aqayan ra bray Gndmyn bar lms krdym.
frstadn rjalh ha bray Qart hsty mn sabqh dard: dr bhmn 1731 nyz hmyn
eml ra anjam dadnd v hsty mra v Hty ArSyv Ghardh salh mra brdnd v ps
ndadnd v balaKrh dr zman emlyat vHSyanh Aqayan mn mSQvl mTaleh nhj
alblaQh bvdm vly znan v hmsaygan hmh gryh v zary mykrdnd, ayn vlayt fqyh
Gmaqy v AmyKth ba Qart v fHaSy bray Aqayan mbark bad.
v br Hsb aKbar vaClh mvcqh AtS byar merkh riys qvh qxaiyh -kh bayd
mXhr qanvn v edalt baSd- bvdh ast. aySan dr Sb GharSnbh bh qm Amdnd v
frman AtS ra Cadr krdnd v bh thran bazgStnd v ba ayn Hal mrdm ma antXar
darnd qanvn v edalt dr kSvr Hkm frma baSd, vqty kh ba mcl mn kh hm
sabqh mbarzaty dard v hm astad bsyary az elma v msivlyn kSvr bvdham
aynTvr eml mySvd ps vay bh Hal mrdm bygnah bypnah.
mn ta Hal bray reayt nXam aslamy kh ba Kvn Shday ezyz ma Abyary Sdh
ast sakt bvdm v ba tHml hmh tedyat v Xlmhayy kh nsbt bh mn v byt mn
v Sagrdan v elaqmndan bh mn v zndany krdn bsyary az Anan anjam mySd
myKvastm Kday nakrdh az naHyh mn bh aslam v anqlab xrbhay vard nSvd,
vly Gh knm kh dKalthay narva dr Hvzh elmyh qm v Skstn Hrym Hvzh
elmyh v az byn brdn astqlal An v qdast mrjeyt v mraje bh vsylh
rah andaKtn bGh hay by mnTq v KSn dr mnaTq mKtlf mvjb aelam nXr
CryH ayn janb Sd. alan hm bh hmh elmay aelam v bzrgan Hvzhha aelam KTr
my knm kh elavh br KTraty kh aqtCad v amnyt kSvr ba An mvajh ast
Hvzhhay dyny v elmy ba vxe fely dr merx sqvT qrar grfth v hrks
sakt v by tfavt baSd bayd dr rvz qyamt pasKgvy skvt Kvd baSd. ayn
janb az abtday Srve anqlab aslamy dr sal 24 hmvarh AsayS v AramS Kvd
v Kanvadh v Hty jan Kvd ra dr merx thajm az KdabyKbran qrar dadham v
frznd ezyzm Shyd mHmd mntXry dr hmyn rah tvsT mnafqyn kvrdl bh Shadt
rsyd, hm aknvn nyz az hrgvnh jan fSany dr rah aslam v anqlab v kSvr dryQ
ndarm.
jay tejb ast kh bexy az Aqayan mHtrm bh mn aXhar mykrdnd kh ba ayn
kh gfth~hay Sma Hq bvdh vly dr SrayT fely v devt az sran kSvrhay
aslamy Kvb bvd Sma CHbt nmykrdyd Qafl az ayn kh CHbt mn bh jayy
xrr nmyzd. AnGh dr SrayT fely ClaH nbvd v CddrCd bh xrr bvd Hmlh
vHSyanh v Qart ba srvCda v zmynh sazy bray tblyQat radyvhay byganh
bvd kh qhra my~fhmand kSvr ma az nXr amnyt namsaed ast v mn bh shm Kvd
xmn tSkr az ksany kh devt dvlt jmhvry aslamy ayran ra pZyrftnd az
ryast mHtrm jmhvry aslamy sival my knm kh Aya jnabealy tvan HfX
amnyt Anan ra dr brabr Hmlh aHtmaly mhajmyn daryd? agr ndaryd ps ba Gh
jraty az Anan devt nmvdh~ayd? v agr tvan An ra daryd ps Gra bray HfX
amnyt mrakz frhngy v danSgah~ha v Hvzh~hay elmyh v ja hay dygr kary jdy
anjam nmy dhyd v az ayn by nXmy~ha jlvgyry nmyknyd?
dr Katmh mtZkr my grdd kh Aqayan ba Sear "mrg br xd vlayt fqyh" dst
bh hmh Krabkaryha my znnd, dr Cvrty kh mn az bnyan gZaran vlayt fqyh
mybaSm v dr ayn mvxve Ghar jld ktab mfCl az mn Gap Sdh, Aqayan
envan kly vlayt fqyh ra ba SKC mKlvT myknnd. mn agr ksy ra vajd
SrayT ndanm ayn amr bh meny xdyt ba kl vlayt fqyh nyst. Gh knym kh kar
dst bGhhay by~svad v by~mnTq aftadh v balaKrh qlm aynja rsyd v sr
bSkst.
mn AnGh SrT blaQ ast ba tv mygvym
tv Kvah az sKnm pnd gyr v Kvah mlal
qm Hsynely mntXry
=end=

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 01:23:44 +0100
From: Farhad Abdolian <farhad@ALGONET.SE>
Subject: namh~y aetraxy grvhy az ahl qlm bh Katmy

Source www.shahrvand.com

=begin=
namh~y aetraxy grvhy az ahl qlm bh Katmy

rast mHtrm jmhvry aslamy aran jnab Aqay Katmy:

frj srkvhy, mntqd adby v rvznamh~ngar, ps az
gZrandn k sal zndan bh tarK hStm bhmn 6731 Azad
Sd v az An zman taknvn bray grftn gZrnamh v sfr
bh Karj az kSvr bh qCd ddar Kanvadh v Srkt dr
nSst~hay frhngy az hmh~y rahhay qanvny aqdam
krdh ama mvfq bh aKZ gZrnamh nSdh ast.

ma fela qCd ndarm az An Gh dr an dv sh sal br
sr nvsndgan aran rfth ast sKn bgvm v hmGnn
nmy~Kvahm bh An Gh br frj srkvhy rfth, aSarh
knm; ama nmy~tvan naddh angaSt kh av aknvn bh
bhanh~hay gvnagvn az daStn gZrnamh v Hq Shrvndy
v qanvny sfr bh Karj mHrvm~ mandh v an mane az An
Sdh ast ta btvand dr nSst~hay frhngy mannd ajlas
jhany vnskv bray rvznamh~ngaran, bh tarK 01 frvrdn
6731 dr astkhlm, v nz sKnrany adby dr danSgah kpnhak
Srkt knd.

ma nvsndgan metqdm kh Azady nvsndh hngamy tHqq
my~abd kh amkan mSarkt v tbadl~nXr v fealt dr
erCh~hay frhngy m v jhany frahm Ad. az an rv bh
ajad hrgvnh maney dr rah sfr an nvsndh bray Srkt
dr nSst~hay frhngy v ddar Kanvadh~aS metrxm.

rvnvSt: Kbrgzary jmhvry aslamy aran, rvznamh~ha
v mjlh~hay kcralantSar kSvr, anjmn jhany qlm (pn)

Hsn aCQry, e babaGahy, prvz babay, e babay, mHmdrxa baTny,
jmSd brzgr, smn bhbhany, bJn bjary, mHmdjefr pvndh, frK
tmmy, elrxa jbary, mHmd jvahrklam, jahd jhanSahy,
amrHsn Ghltn, anvr Kamh~ay, mHmd Kl, rvSnk darvS, e~aSrf drvSan,
mHmvd dvlt~Abady, KSaar dhmy, qasm rvbn, asmael rha,
mHmde spanlv, aHmd Samlv, afSn Sahrvdy, Hsn Skary, prvz Cdaqt,
emran ClaHy, frzanh Tahry, Srn ebady, ebdale eXmy,
ksry enqay, mhdy Qbray, arj kab, mhrangr kar, kaXm krdvany,
mnvGhr krm~zadh, Qlame krmy, mnCvr kvSan, hvSng glSry,
kavh gvhrn, Shla lahjy, jvad mjaby, sar mHmdy, mHmd mKtary,
Hsn mlky, HafX mvsvy, nCrallh mhrgan, Hmd zdan~pnah, abrahm vnsy.
=end=

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 01:25:32 +0100
From: Farhad Abdolian <farhad@ALGONET.SE>
Subject: fwd: ktk~kary nmandgan mjls Svray aslamy dr jlsh elny mjls

Source www.shahrvand.com
=begin=
ktk~kary nmandgan mjls Svray aslamy dr jlsh elny mjls

thran: ktk~kary mHmdHsn jmSdy ardSry nmandh~y bhShr v qdrt~allh nXry na
nmandh kngavr dr jlsh~y elny rvz GharSnbh 72 asfnd (81 marG) mjls Svray
aslamy ra bh tSnj kSand0 ktk~kary an dv tn ps az paan tvxHat ebdallh
nvry vzr kSvr bh svalat mrKl nmandh~y mnab rK dadh ast. mrKl dr sval Kvd
Kvastar pasKgvy vzr kSvr bh an msalh Sdh bvd kh bh Gh dll vzart kSvr
mjvz brgzary mrasm adbvd mhnds mhdy bazrgan nKst~vzr dvlt mvqt ps az
anqlab ra Cadr krd, v Aa an vzartKanh az hvt aSKaCy kh qrar bvdh dr an
mrasm sKnrany knnd, mTle bvdh ast? bed az pasK vzr kSvr, jmSdy ardSry dr
Ha kh elh nhxt Azady Sear v dSnam my~dad, bh svy ebdallh nvry vzr kSvr
hjvm brdh ast. dr bn rah an hjvm nXry~na bh av nzdk my~Svd v ba hman lHn
bh pasKgvy vy my~prdazd. dr hmn Hal an dv nmandh~y mjls aslamy bh jan hm
my~aftnd v Hsaby kdgr ra ktk my~znnd. ps az an deva v bzn bzn tlaS
e~akbr naTq nvry rs mjls bray Aram krdn mjlsy kh nmandh~hay An bh jan hm
aftadh bvdnd bray Gndn dqqh by~ntjh mand. dr hmn hngam QlamHsn Zakry
nmandh~y qvGan KTab bh rs mjls frad my~znd: jmSdy ra tvbK kn.

ktk~kary v bzn bzn nmandgan mjls aslamy dr rvz GharSnbh 81 marG bS az 01
dqqh bh Tvl anjamd.
=end=

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 01:43:27 +0100
From: Farhad Abdolian <farhad@ALGONET.SE>
Subject: 10 years after the ...

source www.shahrvand.com

=begin=
dvstan gramy

dr Cvrt mvafqt ba TrH araih Sdh~y zyr nam tSkl Kvd ra bh farsy v latyn
(ba Hrvf drSt) Hdakcr ta tarK 52/4/8991 brayman bfrstyd ta dr lyst
amxai~knndgan qrar dhym.

dr xmn tqaxa darym kh ayn pyS~nvys ra bray amxai dr aKtyar tmamy nhadhay
dmkratyk, nSryat v radyvhay ayrany v sazmanhay syasy ayrany, bh KaTr jlb
Hmayt v pStybany Anha qrar dhyd.

Smarh faks anjmn dr pars 2124-34341-33

ba drvd

anjmn dfae az zndanyan syasy v eqydty dr ayran - parys 01/3/8991

KTab bh:

riys dyvan byn~almlly lahh

dbyrkl sazman mll mtHd

riys kmsyvn Hqvq bSr sazman mll mtHd

sazman efv byn~almlly

parlman arvpa

amsal mCadf ast ba dhmyn salgrd kStar vsye zndanyan sasy ayran
dr sal 7631 kh br asas frman Kmyny, tnha ba TrH Gnd sval, hzaran
zndany syasy by~dfae ra qtl~eam krdnd.

mHakmh~y eamlan trvr mykvnvs dr dadgah brlyn v ray nhayy dadgah
nSan dad kh trvrysm jmhvry aslamy k pdydh~y dvlty bvdh v tCmym~gyry
dr mvrd An tvsT rhbr rJym aslamy v blndpayh~tryn mqamat Hkvmt Cvrt
my~gyrd. dr Tvl Hyat 81 salh~y Hakmyt rJym jmhvry aslamy ayran hzaran
nfr az mKalfan syasy v eqydty rJym dstgyr v bh KSn~tryn Skl mmkn
Sknjh v aedam Sdh v ya tvsT grvhhay trvr rJym aslamy dr GhargvSh~y
jhan bh qtl rsydh~and, aedamha v trvrha adamh darnd.

ma nhadhay amxai knndh~y ayn namh Kvahan tSkl dadgah byn~almlly bray
brrsy jnayat rJym aslamy hstym. ma Haxrym asnad ayn jnayat ra dr aKtyar
dadgah bgZarym. tedad zyady az zndanyany kh az an jnayat jan salem bdr
brdh, Sahd mstqym An bvdh~and, Amadh~and dr jlsat dadgah Haxr Sdh v bh
Shadt bprdaznd.

ma amydvarym kh ayn drKvast mvrd tvjh Sma qrar gyrd.

ba bhtryn aHtramat

rvnvSt bh:

=end=

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 22:08:14 -0500
From: Rahim Bajoghli <rbajoghli@JUNO.COM>
Subject: US-Iran relations: Bruce Riedel remarks on Iran at Arab-American forum

USIA
25 March 1998

UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT: RIEDEL REMARKS AT ARAB-AMERICAN FORUM
[...]
Bruce Riedel, Special Assistant to the President for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, said March 25.
[...]
We have closely followed the developments in Iran in the last year
since the election of President Muhammed Khatami. We've been
encouraged by some of what we have seen taking place. His CNN
interview contained a number of interesting and positive statements.
Iran's handling of the OIC summit last year was also a step forward,
especially some of the language adopted supporting the Middle East peace
process. Iran's warm welcome for American wrestlers and its decision to
send its own team of wrestlers to Oklahoma this spring are good news and
suggest a common interest in ending the estrangement between our two
peoples. We welcome this approach.

Nonetheless, we must also acknowledge that there remains much about
Iranian behavior that still troubles us and that still poses a serious
risk to stability and security in the Gulf. Iran continues its efforts to
develop weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. We will
continue our efforts to deny Iran access to the technology and expertise
to develop such programs. We have had considerable success in the last
year working with Russia, China, the Ukraine and others in order to do
so.

Secondly, Iran continues to be the principal state sponsor of
terrorist groups throughout the region. Iran has yet, despite its
promises, to break its financial, logistic and other links to groups that
routinely use terror in Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon, Bahrain and elsewhere.

And third, while Iran's rhetoric on the peace process is beginning to
shift in a more positive direction, it continues to provide
considerable support to the most violent opponents of peace, like
Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Consequently, we will need to
maintain a policy of seeking to constrain the dangerous behavior of Iran
while trying to see if the changes in Tehran offer an opportunity for a
better long-term relationship.

We remain convinced that the best way to resolve the differences
between ourselves and Iran is in a government-to-government dialogue.
Only a direct discussion between the two governments can resolve the
issues that separate us. We will raise those issues that concern us. Iran
can raise those issues that it wants. We should also discuss issues of
mutual concern, like the stability of the Gulf, Iraq, Central Asia,
including the future of Afghanistan, where we both have important
equities.

Another key to our policy towards the Gulf is our effort to continue to
advance the Middle East peace process. No government has devoted more
attention and effort to this process than the United States. We are
acutely aware of the dangers that a stalemated peace process poses to the
entire region. The president and his peace process team remain determined
to do what we can to move this forward. At the end of the day, however,
the hard decisions need to be made by the parties in the region, not by
Americans. We will do all we can to assist them, and tonight Ambassador
Ross and I will leave for the region in another
effort to do so.

Finally, we need to do more to develop our bilateral relationships
with our allies in the region. For 50 years the United States has
enjoyed and benefited from a unique and special partnership with Saudi
Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. That
partnership is the bedrock around which our policy in the Gulf has always
been based. We confronted Soviet imperialism together and persevered. We
confronted Khomeini's extremism together and persevered. We fought
Saddam's invasion of Kuwait together, and today Kuwait is free. We have
worked to bring priests in the (Lavant?) together, and we need to
continue to do so.

(End transcript)


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------------------------------

Date: Thu, 26 Mar 1998 00:07:28 -0500
From: Rahim Bajoghli <rbajoghli@JUNO.COM>
Subject: U.S.-Iranian Ties Slowly Improving

U.S.-Iranian Ties Slowly Improving

By Donna Abu-Nasr
Associated Press Writer
March 25, 1998

WASHINGTON (AP) -- U.S. scholars attending a seminar in Iran were
surprised by the warm reception they got -- from the people and
the government. They weren't frisked at the shrine of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, for example, and they shared a meal of spicy
lamb and rice with the deputy foreign minister.

``I didn't have one word of hostility aimed at me. No one was
trampling on any (U.S.) flags,'' said Roscoe Suddarth, a former State
Department official who heads the Middle East Institute. ``We were
treated with great courtesy, and I would say even deferentially.''

They also found interest in the West among the people: A textile
merchant in the Iranian city of Isfahan wanted Suddarth to get the
makers of Camel cigarettes to send him a copy of their original camel
logo to put on his cloth.

Suddarth and five other scholars -- two of them former U.S.
government officials -- recently returned from a trip to Iran, where they
attended a conference on Persian Gulf security as guests of the Foreign
Ministry. But their visit to the country where the United States has
often been denounced as the ``Great Satan'' was more than an academic
jaunt.

It was another step in the people-to-people contacts that Iran and the
United States have been encouraging since January, when Iranian President
Mohammad Khatami broke with a rigid anti-West policy and called for an
exchange of scholars and athletes. The new contacts have raised hopes
that ties severed after the 1979 Islamic revolution ousted the
U.S.-backed shah could be resumed.

The scholars' visit came a week after a group of American wrestlers, the
first U.S. athletes to visit Iran in 19 years, received an ecstatic
welcome by thousands of fans at an international competition in Tehran.

Around the time of the scholars' trip, an Iranian scholar was in the
United States as the guest of a Philadelphia think tank. Suddarth has
extended an invitation to two other scholars to come to the United States
and his institute is planning, with Georgetown University, a conference
assessing the Iranian revolution at its 20th anniversary next February.

State Department officials see the exchanges as a good way for
Americans and Iranians to get to know each other, with a view that
they will eventually lead to a government-to-government dialogue.

Iranian officials are not forthcoming about their hopes for the contacts
with Americans. Partly because of opposition to Khatami's efforts to
nurture better relations with the United States, they stick publicly to
the official view that the Iranian president's moves are not aimed at
opening formal relations with Washington, but are part of an overall
policy of reducing tensions.

But Iran has subtler ways of getting its real message across.
When the wrestlers were in Tehran, the U.S. flag was not only
allowed to go unburned but also permitted to fly.

The scholars said they were given more access than their European
and Arab counterparts and even had a brief meeting with Iranian
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi. They were invited to the house of
Kharrazi's deputy, Gholam Khoshroo, where they exchanged views
over dinner.

Suddarth also met with a group of young, chador-clad female students who
asked him how many children he had and whether he believed in God. And
his tour guide on the trip to Isfahan was a woman -- this in a
conservative country that discourages women from mingling socially, even
with male relatives.

``You had a sense that it's a society where not everybody is an
ayatollah,'' said Suddarth.

Geoffrey Kemp, a former security aide in the Reagan White House
who is now with the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom in Washington,
said that although U.S.-Iran relations are ``slowly improving, ... it
will take time before the Iranian government is ready to talk formally in
a bilateral context with the United States government.'' Jerrold Green,
another invited scholar, agreed with Kemp's assessment.

``The very fact that we w
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ere there and were having these discussions was
quite useful,'' said Green, associate chairman at the Rand Research
Center in California. ``But if they're going to make dramatic changes, it
certainly wouldn't be in this kind of a setting.''








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------------------------------

Date: Thu, 26 Mar 1998 00:06:10 -0500
From: Rahim Bajoghli <rbajoghli@JUNO.COM>
Subject: Congressional Record: The American missile protection act of 1998

The American missile protection act of 1998

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to make it the
policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense system
as soon as technology permits. I am pleased that the distinguished
Senator from Hawaii, Mr. Inouye, is joining me as cosponsor of this
legislation, the American Missile Protection Act of 1998.

A new type of ballistic missile threat is emerging in the world
today, one that derives not from a cold war strategic balance but from
the increasing proliferation of ballistic missile technology, from the
stated desire of some nation states to acquire such delivery systems, and
from their evident progress in doing so. Last year, the Governmental
Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and
Federal Services held a series of 11 hearings examining
proliferation-related issues. The evidence from those hearings forms the
basis for the findings in this bill.

First, we found, and this bill recites, that the threat of weapons of
mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic missiles is among the
most serious security issues facing the United States. There is
widespread agreement on this. For the last 4 years, the President has
annually declared that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons, and the means of delivering such weapons, constitute
``an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States.'' And the Senate said in
legislation in 1996 that ``it is in the supreme interest of the United
States to defend itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile
attack, whatever the source.''

The second finding in the bill is that the long-range ballistic
missile threat to the United States is increasing. The leaders of
several rogue states have stated their belief that missiles capable of
striking our territory would enable them to coerce or deter the United
States, and they have declared their desire and intent to acquire these
delivery systems. Ballistic missiles are increasingly the weapon of
choice. They were used only once between World War II and 1980, but
thousands have been fired in at least six conflicts since 1980.

Furthermore, the clear trend is toward missiles with greater range. For
example, since the early 1980s, North Korea has progressed from having to
purchase 300-kilometer-range Scud missiles to developing its own
6,000-kilometer-range ballistic missile, which the intelligence community
says may be capable of striking Alaska and Hawaii in less than 15 years.
Iran's progress in developing extended range missiles has been dramatic
and sudden, posing a new threat to U.S. forces in the Middle East.

The technological advances of the information age have made vast
amounts of previously classified, arcane technical information
available to anyone with Internet access. Advances in commercial
aerospace have made once-exotic components and materials commonplace and
more easily obtainable, and the demand for space-based telecommunications
has vastly increased demand for space launch vehicles. These developments
mean that the technical information, hardware, and other resources
necessary to build ballistic missiles are increasingly available and
accessible worldwide.

So, too, is scientific and technical expertise from Russia and China,
which have been primary suppliers of equipment, materials, and technology
related to weapons of mass destruction. Efforts by the administration to
stop such assistance from these two countries have not been successful.

America's well-known vulnerability serves to feed this growing
threat. As long as potential adversaries know we cannot defend
ourselves against these weapons, they have every incentive to acquire or
develop them.

The third finding in the bill is that the ability of the United
States to anticipate the rate of progress in rogue ballistic missile
programs is questionable. In the past, the United States has been
surprised by the technical innovation of other natio
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ns, particularly with
respect to ballistic missiles. There are many reasons for this, including
help from other nations and the willingness of some states to field
systems with lower accuracy requirements than would be acceptable to the
United States. In both cases, the result can be progress that is more
rapid than expected. Just 2 months ago, for example, the Director of
Central Intelligence stated, ``Iran's success in getting technology
and materials from Russian companies, combined with recent indigenous
Iranian advances means that it could have a medium-range missile much
sooner than I assessed last year.''

That year, last year, in 1997, Mr. Tenet testified that Iran could
have such a missile by 2007, the year 2007. While he didn't say how much
sooner than 2007 when he testified recently, State Department officials
have testified since then that Iran could develop this missile this year,
9 years earlier than had been predicted only a year ago.

Iran's rapid progress demonstrates how external assistance can affect the
pace of missile programs. And, of course, predicting the amount of
outside assistance any nation will receive is nearly impossible. The CIA
has recognized this difficulty, stating recently to the Senate that,
``gaps and uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly when `rest
of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''

This bill's fourth finding is that the failure to prepare a defense
against ballistic missiles could have grave security and foreign policy
consequences for the United States. An attack on the United States by a
ballistic missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction would be
catastrophic, inflicting death and injury to potentially thousands of
American citizens. Even the threat of such an attack could constrain
American options in dealing with regional challenges to our interests,
deter us from taking action, or prompt allies to question America's
security guarantees. All of this would have serious consequences for
the United States and international stability.

The fifth finding is that it is imperative for the United States to be
prepared for rogue nations acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed
with weapons of mass destruction. The Senate, in its resolution of
ratification for the START II treaty, declared that ``. . . because
deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States against
long-range ballistic missile threats, missile defenses are a necessary
part of new deterrent strategies.'' Former Defense Secretary Perry said
in 1994 that we have an opportunity to move from ``mutual assured
destruction'' to ``mutual assured safety.'' And in 1997, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy testified in the Senate that we ``are
quite willing to acknowledge that if we saw a rogue state, a potential
proliferant, beginning to develop a long-range ICBM capable of reaching
the United States, we would have to give very, very serious attention to
deploying a limited national missile defense.'' Mr. President, our
Nation's interests will be served better being prepared 1 year too soon
rather than 1 year too late.

This bill's sixth and final finding acknowledges the United States
has no defenses deployed against weapons of mass destruction delivered by
long-range ballistic missiles and no policy to deploy such a national
missile defense system. We have only a policy to wait and see.

The bill in its final paragraph provides, ``It is the policy of the
United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible, a National
Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United
States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,
unauthorized, or deliberate).''

This policy statement accomplishes two things. It sends a clear
message to any rogue state seeking ballistic missile delivery systems
that America will not be vulnerable to these weapons indefinitely. And,
second, it affirms that the United States will take the steps necessary
to protect its citizens from missile attack. That is what the bill is.
That is what it say
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s.

Now, let me briefly say what it is not. It is not a referendum on the ABM
Treaty. It does not prescribe a specific system architecture. It does not
mandate a deployment date, only that we deploy as soon as the technology
is ready. It is not a directive to negotiate or cooperate on missile
defense programs. It does not initiate studies or

[[Page S2307]]

reports. Nor is it a declaration that the only weapon of mass
destruction threat to the United States is from weapons delivered by
long-range ballistic missiles--other delivery methods are also of concern
but we have programs in place to defend against those threats. This bill
is designed to deal only with the accelerating proliferation threat.

In his State of the Union Address President Clinton said, ``preparing for
a far off storm that may reach our shores is far wiser than ignoring the
thunder 'til the clouds are just overhead.'' He wasn't talking about
national missile defense, but his words do apply precisely to this
dilemma. We are hearing the thunder now, and the time has come to declare
to our citizens and to the world and to demonstrate by our actions that
the United States will not remain defenseless against ballistic missiles.
That should be our policy and this bill states that it is our policy.

A letter to all Senators is going out inviting cosponsors to join us when
we reintroduce the bill within the next 2 weeks. I ask unanimous consent
a copy of the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:

S. 1806

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited at the ``American Missile Protection
Act of 1998''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction delivered by
long-range ballistic missiles is among the most serious
security issues facing the United States.
(A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton certified,
that ``I . . . find that the proliferation of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons (`weapons of mass
destruction') and the means of delivering such weapons,
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with
that threat.'' This state of emergency was reaffirmed in
1995, 1996, and 1997.
(B) In 1994 the President stated, that ``there is nothing
more important to our security and the world's stability than
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles''.
(C) Several countries hostile to the United States have
been particularly determined to acquire missiles and weapons
of mass destruction. President Clinton observed in January of
1998, for example, that ``Saddam Hussein has spent the better
part of this decade, and much of his nation's wealth, not on
providing for the Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver
them''.
(D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ``it is in the
supreme interest of the United States to defend itself from
the threat of limited ballistic missile attack, whatever the
source.''
(2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the United
States is increasing.
(A) Several adversaries of the United States have stated
their intention to acquire intercontinental ballistic
missiles capable of attacking the United States.
(i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has stated, ``If they
know that you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the
United States, they would not be able to hit you. If we had
possessed a deterrent--missiles that could reach New York--we
would have hit it at
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the same moment. Consequently, we should
build this force so that they and others will no longer think
about an attack.''
(ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Palestine Liberation Front,
has stated, ``I would love to be able to reach the American
shore, but this is very difficult. Someday an Arab country
will have ballistic missiles. Someday an Arab country will
have a nuclear bomb. It is better for the United States and
for Israel to reach peace with the Palestinians before that
day.''
(iii) Saddam Hussein has stated, ``Our missiles cannot
reach Washington. If we could reach Washington, we would
strike if the need arose.''
(iv) Iranian actions speak for themselves. Iran's
aggressive pursuit of medium-range ballistic missiles capable
of striking Central Europe--aided by the continuing
collaboration of outside agents--demonstrates Tehran's intent
to acquire ballistic missiles of ever-increasing range.
(B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess ballistic missiles,
with at least 10 of those countries developing over 20 new
types of ballistic missiles.
(C) From the end of World War II until 1980, ballistic
missiles were used in one conflict. Since 1980, thousands of
ballistic missiles have been fired in at least six different
conflicts.
(D) The clear trend among countries hostile to the United
States is toward having ballistic missiles of greater range.
(i) North Korea first acquired 300-kilometer range Scud Bs,
then developed and deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is
currently deploying the 1000-kilometer range No-Dong, and is
developing the 2000-kilometer range Taepo-Dong 1 and 6000-
kilometer range Taepo-Dong 2, which would be capable of
striking Alaska and Hawaii.
(ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range CSS-8s, progressed
through the Scud B and Scud C, and is developing the 1300-
kilometer range Shahab-3 and 2000-kilometer range Shahab-4,
which would allow Iran to strike Central Europe.
(iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash program, produced a new
missile, the Al-Hussein, with twice the range of its Scud Bs.
(iv) Experience gained from extending the range of short-
and medium-range ballistic missiles facilitates the
development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(E) The technical information, hardware, and other
resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are
increasingly available and accessible worldwide.
(i) Due to advances in information technology, a vast
amount of technical information relating to ballistic missile
design, much of it formerly classified, has become widely
available and is increasingly accessible through the Internet
and other distribution avenues.
(ii) Components, tools, and materials to support ballistic
missile development are increasingly available in the
commercial aerospace industry.
(iii) Increasing demand for satellite-based
telecommunications is adding to the demand for commercial
Space Launch Vehicles, which employ technology that is
essentially identical to that of intercontinental ballistic
missiles. As this increasing demand is met, the technology
and expertise associated with space launch vehicles also
proliferate.
(F) Russia and China have provided significant technical
assistance to rogue nation ballistic missile programs,
accelerating the pace of those efforts. In June of 1997, the
Director of Central Intelligence, reporting to Congress on
weapons of mass destruction-related equipment, materials, and
technology, stated that ``China and Russia continued to be
the primary suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to
stem the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to
countries of concern.''
(G) Russia and China continue to engage in missile
proliferation.

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(i) Despite numerous Russian assurances not to assist Iran
with its ballistic missile program, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation testified to the
Senate, that ``the problem is this: there is a disconnect
between those reassurances, which we welcome, and what we
believe is actually occurring.''
(ii) Regarding China's actions to demonstrate the sincerity
of its commitment to nonproliferation, the Director of
Central Intelligence testified to the Senate on January 28,
1998, that, ``the jury is still out on whether the recent
changes are broad enough in scope and whether they will hold
over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in this
area will require continued close watching.''
(H) The inability of the United States to defend itself
against weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range
ballistic missile provides additional incentive for hostile
nations to develop long-range ballistic missiles with which
to threaten the United States. Missiles are widely viewed as
valuable tools for deterring and coercing a vulnerable United
States.
(3) The ability of the United States to anticipate future
ballistic missile threats is questionable.
(A) The Intelligence Community has failed to anticipate
many past technical innovations (for example, Iraq's
extended-range Al-Hussein missiles and its development of a
space launch vehicle) and outside assistance enables rogue
states to surmount traditional technological obstacles to
obtaining or developing ballistic missiles of increasing
range.
(B) In June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence
reported to Congress that ``many Third World countries--with
Iran being the most prominent example--are responding to
Western counter-proliferation efforts by relying more on
legitimate commercial firms as procurement fronts and by
developing more convoluted procurement networks.''
(C) In June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence
stated to Congress that ``gaps and uncertainties preclude a
good projection of exactly when `rest of the world' countries
will deploy ICBMs.''
(D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence testified
that Iran would have a medium-range missile by 2007. One year
later the Director stated, ``since I testified, Iran's
success in getting technology and materials from Russian
companies, combined with recent indigenous Iranian advances,
means that it could have a medium-range missile much sooner
than I assessed last year.'' Department of State officials
have testified that Iran could be prepared to deploy such a
missile as early as late 1998, nine years earlier than had
been predicted one year before by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(4) The failure to prepare adequately for long-range
ballistic missile threats could have severe national security
and foreign policy consequences for the United States.
(A) An attack on the United States by a ballistic missile
equipped with a weapon of mass destruction could inflict
catastrophic death or injury to citizens of the United States
and severe damage to their property.

[[Page S2308]]

(B) A rogue state's ability to threaten the United States
with an intercontinental ballistic missile may constrain the
United States' options in dealing with regional threats to
its interests, deter the United States from taking
appropriate action, or prompt allies to question United
States security guarantees, thereby weakening alliances of
the United States and the United States' world leadership
position.
(5) The United States must be prepared for rogue nations
acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of
mass destruction.
(A) In its resolution of ratificati
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on for the START II
Treaty, the United States Senate declared that ``because
deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States
against long-range ballistic missile threats, missile
defenses are a necessary part of new deterrent strategies.''
(B) In September of 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry stated
that in the post-Cold War era, ``we now have opportunity to
create a new relationship based not on MAD, not on Mutual
Assured Destruction, but rather on another acronym, MAS, or
Mutual Assured Safety.''
(C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy testified to the Senate that ``I and the
administration are quite willing to acknowledge that if we
saw a rogue state, a potential proliferant, beginning to
develop a long-range ICBM capable of reaching the United
States, we would have to give very, very serious attention to
deploying a limited national missile defense.''
(6) The United States has no defense deployed against
weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic
missiles and no policy to deploy such a national missile
defense system.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as
is technologically possible a National Missile Defense system
capable of defending the territory of the United States
against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,
unauthorized, or deliberate).


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------------------------------

Date: Wed, 25 Mar 1998 23:31:34 -0500
From: Rahim Bajoghli <rbajoghli@JUNO.COM>
Subject: Congressional Record: Iran's ballistic missile program

[Congressional Record: March 24, 1998 (Senate)][Page S2452-S2462]
>From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov][DOCID:cr24mr98-154]


Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would like......

[...]
Let me say this to the Senate. I and a number of my colleagues have
watched with concern as Iran has worked aggressively to develop longer
range theater ballistic missiles.

There have been many reports that a new Iranian missile, the Shahab-3,
may be tested within the coming year.

This new missile, with a range approaching 1,300 kilometers, can now
reach targets in the Middle East that were previously not threatened by
ballistic missiles from Iran.

Further, the Shahab-3's velocity and range could require changes in our
own theater missile defense systems currently under development.

Obviously, our allies, particularly Israel, are very concerned about this
new Iranian missile development effort. In parallel--and I believe this
is of utmost importance--North Korea has continued to pursue the
development of a longer range missile. They are working on the no dong
and the taepo dong missiles. These missiles have created concern not just
in Asia, but in my home State of Alaska, as well as in Hawaii, which is
the home State of both of my colleagues from Hawaii.

Now, I believe the Senate should know that the first targets within the
reach of the longer range Korean missiles are in fact the States of
Alaska and Hawaii.

As a nation, I think we have to react swiftly to the threat posed by
these new ballistic missile development and test efforts.
Senator Kyl and others who have watched this issue closely have urged
that we take action now to respond to this threat. Therefore, I have
offered this amendment on behalf of Senator Kyl and myself to provide
emergency appropriations to respond to this dangerous new threat.

The amendment will provide $151 million for urgent development
efforts which directly address these new missile threats. I might say
that this matter has been reviewed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

They have indicated that if additional resources are not made
available, they can address these initiatives with reallocation of
existing funds. Now, that is exactly what we don't want. The funds have
already been allocated, and what this bill is doing is trying to make
additional funds available to make up for the ones that have already been
used in Bosnia and in the deployment in Southwest Asia.

This amendment provides for better integration of Army and Navy
missile defense systems and radars, for additional testing of the
Patriot and lower tier systems against these longer range

[[Page S2457]]

theater ballistic missiles, and other efforts which will link our
existing sensors, communications, and weapon systems to defeat improved
theater ballistic missiles.

In addition, the amendment specifically provides funds to assist
Israel in purchasing a third arrow missile battery. The capabilities of
the emerging Iranian threat force us and Israel to add additional
batteries to protect not only our forces, but our allies in Israel.

Mr. President, I believe these efforts have some of the most urgent
projects we could undertake in the Department of Defense. As I indicated,
Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre wrote a letter bringing these
needed investments to the attention of our colleagues in the House. The
emergency supplemental before us provides an opportunity to deal with
these critical investments. But we cannot do it from here directly. This
amendment provides that the moneys in the amendment will only be
available if there is an official budget estimate for the amounts that
are designated to be an emergency. This would be in a request transmitted
to the Congress as emergency requirements, as defined in the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended.

Now, as I say, the amendment I offered for the Senator from Arizona, Mr.
Kyl, does not make that money available. It will only be available if the
administration agrees that there is a critical
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issue here and that these
moneys should be available now to deal with these issues.

Mr. President, we have troops, once again, stationed in this area. We do
not have an adequate theater missile defense system. We don't have a
missile defense system that is even currently planned for the total 50
States. When it was presented to our committee, the Department
specifically pointed out that it was not possible for a period of 15 or
more years to cover the States of Alaska and Hawaii. But a theater
missile defense system would.

I believe there is an emergency. I believe it is highly important
that we proceed to make these investments. I do not think the
investments should be made available from funds we have already
appropriated for other critical projects in the Department; nor do I
think we should defer acquisitions of new systems. That has been done too
much already.

Mr. President, we spent more time in the last 3 years reprogramming money
we have already made available to the Department of Defense than we have
in considering how much money should be available to the Department of
Defense. I don't want to start the concept of reprogramming. What this
does is, it says to the administration that if they are as serious as we
are about proceeding now with the ballistic missile defense system--we
have made the finding ourselves that it is an emergency, and we ask the
President to simply make the decision. I hope the executive branch will
agree that these funds will respond to security crises and the projects
should be added. If they do not, these funds would not be available under
this amendment. I do believe that my
good friend from Hawaii wants to make a statement on the matter when he
arrives.

(At the request of Mr. Stevens, the following statement was ordered to be
printed in the Record.)

Mr. KYL. Madam President, my amendment to the supplemental
appropriations bill (S. 1768) would accelerate the development and
deployment of theater missile defense systems.

Recent revelations that Iran has nearly completed development of two new
ballistic missiles--made possible with Russian assistance--that will
allow it to strike targets as far away as Central Europe have convinced
me that U.S. theater missile defenses must be accelerated in order to
counter the emerging Iranian threat. This increased Iranian missile
threat has materialized much sooner than expected due to the extensive
assistance Russia has provided over the past year.

According to press reports, development of Iran's 1,300 kilometer-
range Shahab-3 missile, which will be capable of reaching Israel, could
be completed in 12 to 18 months. Development of a longer-range missile,
called the Shahab-4, whose 2,000 kilometer range will allow it to reach
targets in Central Europe, could be completed in as little as three
years. Both missiles could be armed with chemical or biological warheads.
These revelations are part of a string of very troubling disclosures that
have surfaced over the past year detailing the extensive aid Russia has
provided to Iran.

A bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives have been working on
various legislative approaches to address the Iranian threat for some
time. For example, last fall both Houses of Congress passed a Concurrent
Resolution which Representative Jane Harman and I submitted expressing
the sense of the Congress that the Administration should impose sanctions
against the Russian organizations and individuals that have transferred
ballistic missile technology to Iran. The annual foreign aid bill passed
last year also contains a provision conditioning the release of foreign
aid to Russia on a halt to the transfer of nuclear and missile technology
to Iran. And, Senator Lott and Representative Gilman have introduced
legislation that would require that sanctions be imposed against any
entity caught transferring goods to support Iran's ballistic missile
program.

In addition to these legislative initiatives, the Administration has
engaged in a series of diplomatic exchanges with the Russians.
According t
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o press accounts, Vice President Gore has raised the issue
with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on several occasions. President Clinton
has discussed the matter with President Yeltsin at the Helsinki summit in
March 1997 and at the P-8 summit last June. The President also appointed
Ambassador Frank Wisner as his special envoy to hold detailed discussions
with Russian officials about the dangers of aiding Iran's ballistic
missile program. This is a very serious issue which the Clinton
Administration has clearly acknowledged.

As a result of the Administration's diplomatic efforts, in January
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a decree issuing catch-all
export controls on nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile technology.
The Russian government has also said it will not assist Iran's missile
program. While we all hope this will lead to an end to the transfer of
Russian missile hardware and expertise to Iran, I think the jury is still
out on whether Moscow will fully comply with its obligations. For
example, just one month after Prime Minister Chernomyrdin issued the
decree on catch-all export controls, the Washington Times reported that
Russia was still providing missile aid to Tehran. Specifically Russia and
Iran's intelligence services were reportedly coordinating a visit to
Moscow by a group of Iranian missile
technicians and Russian missile experts were planning to teach courses in
Tehran on missile guidance systems and pyrotechnics.

It is also worth remembering that Russia promised three years ago to
phase out conventional arms sales to Iran and to join the Missile
Technology Control Regime. In addition, last March, President Yeltsin
assured President Clinton at the Helsinki summit that it was not Russia's
policy to assist Iran's missile program. But Russia has given missile aid
to Iran in violation of these commitments. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Einhorn summarized this situation well in Senate testimony last
year stating, We have pressed the Russian leadership at the highest
levels and we have been told that it is not Russia's policy to assist
Iran's long-range missile program. But the problem is this: There's a
disconnect between those reassurances, which we welcome, and what we
believe is actually occurring.

In any event, the United States and our allies must be prepared to
protect ourselves from the possibility that Iran will use ballistic
missiles armed with nuclear, biological, or nuclear warheads. It is that
possibility that this amendment is intended to address. Neither the
United States nor Israel will have missile defenses capable of countering
the threat from the Shahab-3 or Shahab-4 missiles before those systems
are deployed. This amendment provides funding to accelerate the
development of some key theater missile defense systems, as well as
procurement of items for a third Arrow missile defense battery for
Israel.
In crafting this amendment, I have worked closely with the Defense
Department and my colleagues in the

[[Page S2458]]

House of Representatives. Last month, Deputy Defense Secretary Hamre
identified a variety of initiatives which DoD felt were needed to counter
the new missile threat from Iran. In a letter to Representative Weldon,
Mr. Hamre indicated the Administration felt so strongly about the need
for these new initiatives that if additional funding was not provided,
that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization would reprogram $100
million from existing missile defense programs for this purpose.
Reprogramming missile defense funds would be counterproductive since, in
effect, we would be robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The $100 million of funding for initiatives identified by DoD are the
core of this amendment. This funding requested by the Administration
would provide:

$35 million for integration of the Patriot (PAC-3), Navy Upper and Lower
Tier, and THAAD radar systems to allow earlier, more accurate cueing that
will increase the effective range of these missile defense systems.

$15 million to accelerate completion of the PAC-3 remote launch
capability.
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Remote launch allows PAC-3 missiles to be deployed at
considerable distances from the PAC-3 radars effectively doubling the
amount of territory defended.

$40 million for one additional test flight of the PAC-3 and Navy
Lower Tier systems to test their capabilities against longer-range
missiles such as the Shahab-3 missile that Iran is developing.
$10 million to improve interoperability between the Arrow and U.S.
TMD systems.

In addition to providing funding for the programs identified by the
Administration, this amendment would also provide $6 million to integrate
a variety of sensors and communication systems to provide better, more
accurate early warning data from a missile launch, and $45 million to
purchase a third radar for the Israeli Arrow system, the first step
toward eventually providing a third battery of the system to Israel.

The proposals contained in this amendment enjoy bipartisan support. Last
week, the House National Security Committee passed a bill, which is very
similar to the amendment I have offered, by a vote of 45 to 0.

It is also important to note that the amendment I have offered simply
makes $151 million in funding available to the administration. In order
for the Administration to use this funding it must designate it as an
emergency requirement.

In closing, I thank the distinguished Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee, Senator Stevens for his support and urge my Senate colleagues
to support this amendment which will help ensure that the United States
and its allies can take meaningful steps to counter the growing threat
from Iran's missile program.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection,
it is so ordered.



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End of DNI-NEWS Digest - 24 Mar 1998 to 25 Mar 1998 - Special issue
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