Date: May 7, 1999 [ 0: 0: 1]

Subject: DNI-NEWS Digest - 2 May 1999 to 6 May 1999

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Subject: DNI-NEWS Digest - 2 May 1999 to 6 May 1999
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There are 3 messages totalling 350 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

1. JPost: Friendly discord on Iran
2. Ha'aretz: Iran earns a rare seal of approval
3. WPost: Rumsfeld: Intelligence 'Need to Know' Smacks of Not to Know


Date: Thu, 6 May 1999 02:46:41 -0400
From: Rahim Bajoghli <rbajoghli@JUNO.COM>
Subject: JPost: Friendly discord on Iran

Jerusalem Post
Wednesday, May 5, 1999

Friendly discord on Iran

(May 5) - It's clear that Israel and the US do not see eye-to-eye on all
issues on the agenda. However, only nations whose relations are founded
on a solid base of strategic cooperation and understanding can, on
occasion, disagree on a particular point, without unraveling the
close ties between them.

No one has concealed the existing differences of opinion between
Jerusalem and Washington on the subject of Jerusalem, the settlements and
the pace of Israeli redeployment in Judea and Samaria. Much is heard of
these, often with a considerable degree of exaggeration on the severity
of the American reaction. There is, however, another issue: Israel's
objection to America's U-turn with regard Iran.

In his talks in Washington last week, Defense Minister Moshe Arens raised
the question of this new approach in relations with Iran. Until now, the
US had been guided by the concept of "dual containment" with regard to
both Iraq and Iran. Recently the Americans have tended to deviate from
this line and they are striving to normalize their
relations with Iran.

This trend may cause a setback to the joint American- Israeli endeavor in
persuading the Russians to stop assisting Iran's development of nuclear
and ballistic weapons. If Washington grows closer to Teheran, the
Russians in turn may be encouraged to woo the Iranian
government. So far, the Russians have not had to compete with US activity
in Iran, as the Americans had boycotted Iran. Now, however, Russia will
do everything in its power to protect its political and economic
advantages in this country.

The dispute between Israel and the Americans on this issue is one between
friends. Even inside the American establishment there are those who
question the mistaken assumption that Mohammad Khatami, president of
Iran, will be willing to give up his extreme position towards the "Great
Satan," as the US is called by the Iranians.

The American illusion of a possible dialogue with Khatami, may well
increase Khatami's powers of extortion in Moscow, causing the waste of
efforts invested until now in persuading Russia not to assist Iran in
equipping itself with atomic weapons and long-range missiles.

Is Israel entitled to equip the aircraft which the Americans have offered
to sell us with Israeli-manufactured radar, or does it have to purchase
such equipment from an American plant? Pentagon policy is to support
American plants.

This is nothing new. During the 1970s, when the US offered to sell Israel
F-16 fighter planes, there was a disagreement between Shimon Peres and
Yitzhak Rabin as to whether to make the purchase contingent on agreement
by the American factory to order certain components from Israel. It would
be fair to assume that on this occasion too, a way will be found to
accommodate the needs of both American and Israeli industry. In the
meantime, the competition continues.

There is no reason to assume that the American administration has any
interest in undermining the joint Israeli-Russian venture to build an
advanced helicopter for the Turkish army, comprising a Russian body and
Israeli avionics. American companies, however, showed a strong
interest in this deal and they were able to set the wheels of American
policy rolling in their favor.

The recent US vote at UN committee on human rights against
returning to the partition-plan map, based on the 1947 UN resolution, has
absolved us of disputing the principle of whether it is possible to turn
back the clock of history. Is the aggressor entitled to receive a
guarantee that, whatever the outcome of a war which he initiates, he is
certain that he may return to the opening point, as if he had not lost
the contest?

Israel embarked on the Oslo process based on the assumption that the
Palestinians were willing to come to terms with Israel and seek a
territorial compromise with it.
Palestinian talk of a return to the 1947 borders, which at the time were
likened by one of the members of the American UN delegation to a portrait
by Picasso, undermine the foundations on which the peace process is
based. Israel must discuss this point of principle with the US prior to
renewing the negotiations with the Palestinians.

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Date: Thu, 6 May 1999 08:11:26 -0400
From: Rahim Bajoghli <rbajoghli@JUNO.COM>
Subject: Ha'aretz: Iran earns a rare seal of approval

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Tuesday, April 27, 1999

Iran earns a rare seal of approval

By Ze'ev Schiff It is not every day that Iran is the target of
compliments from the West and even more unusual that these compliments
are lavished on Iran's handling of chemical weapons. The new Journal of
the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) devotes its opening article to
Iran, stressing that Iran is the first country in the Middle East to
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Israel has signed it, of
course, but
is delaying full ratification. Arab states such as Egypt, Iraq, Libya,
Lebanon and Sudan, on the other hand, have yet to sign the convention.The
compliments sent Iran's way are for the actions it has taken in the area
of chemical weapons. In accordance with the convention, Iran has
submitted the list of its facilities that produce chemical weapons, as
well as the locations and sizes of its weapons stockpiles. Moreover, it
did not take advantage of the relatively long period provided by the
convention for
countries to destroy the chemical weapons in their possession. It hurried
to do so, demolishing the production lines in the presence of supervisors
of the international organization.

The journal of the OPCW stresses that Iranian spokesmen, including the
secretary of the Supreme Council for National Defense, Hassan Ruhani,
said they now expect that all limitations on trading and transferring
chemical technology to Iran will be lifted by the countries that have
signed the convention.

During this year, international restrictions will be introduced on those
countries that have not yet ratified the CWC. Israel will also be subject
to these restrictions if it does not ratify the convention during this
time. This
will lead to direct and indirect damage to Israeli industry. The Ministry
of Trade and Industry has presented the cabinet with its estimation that
such restrictions will cause tens of millions of shekels of damage each

These sums could increase when restrictions on trade with chemical
industries of countries that have not signed the convention are stepped
up. Iran, on the other hand, will receive a seal of approval where
chemical weaponry is

Israeli intelligence sources, however, do not believe the reports
concerning Iran's destruction of its chemical weapons. The only way to
confirm the reports is by in-depth supervision conducted by the OPCW. But
as long as Israel has not yet ratified the convention, it does not have
the right to demand such supervision.

Iran's foreign minister, Kamel Harazi, hurried to inform the OPCW's
director that if Iran is attacked with chemical weapons, as it has been
in the past, it will demand that the international organization and its
member countries
immediately lend it assistance. This is included as one of the articles
of the convention. For the first time, Iran has reported that now, 11
years after its war with Iraq, some 30,000 Iranians still require medical
for injuries incurred from the mustard gas used by Iraq against Iran, and
that many are still dying as a result of these injuries.

In all, tens of thousands of Iranians were injured or killed by Iraq's
use of chemical weapons. Consequently, Iran has amassed considerable
medical expertise in this area. Tehran is now offering to establish a
center in Iran
for the treatment of victims of chemical warfare. In addition, an
international conference for the training of doctors will be held there
in May.

The Iranians have also given much thought to the steps they will take
concerning chemical warfare. I recently had the opportunity to meet with
Iranian representatives in Europe who said that Iran, in any case, had
halted its production of chemical weapons. The Iranians estimated that if
they did not immediately destroy the chemical weapons in the presence of
OPCW supervisors, there would be no way to end the West's suspicions of
the Iranian regime. They then decided that it was preferable to destroy
the stockpiles immediately, thus gaining points in the eyes of
international public opinion and various foreign ministries worldwide.

The Iranians have not been proved wrong in their calculations. The only
way to cancel this achievement is if unanticipated in-depth spot checks,
based on specific intelligence, uncover that Iran has deceived the OPCW.
This is not the current state of mind in the organization.

Additionally, it should be noted that the OPCW concentrates exclusively
on chemical weapons and ignores Iran's plans in the areas of nuclear and
biological weaponry. These areas do not fall under the OPCW's
jurisdiction, and the group considers them to be entirely divorced from
Iran's chemical
commitments - something which is certainly true, given the manufacture of
the long-range ground-to-ground Shihab 3 missiles Iran has recently
boasted about launching

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Date: Thu, 6 May 1999 02:35:51 -0400
From: Rahim Bajoghli <rbajoghli@JUNO.COM>
Subject: WPost: Rumsfeld: Intelligence 'Need to Know' Smacks of Not to Know

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Washington Post
Wednesday, May 5, 1999

Rumsfeld: Intelligence 'Need to Know' Smacks of Not to Know

By Walter Pincus

Former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld and other members of a
commission weighing new missile threats saw something that seemed strange
as they got briefed recently at CIA headquarters in Langley.

According to a participant in the meeting, intelligence analysts
constantly got up to leave the room when certain questions arose outside
their specialty. The reason: The answers included highly classified
material that the analysts were not cleared to hear.

"We found that China experts had to get up and leave when talk turned to
Iran," one source said.

In the intelligence world, the means used to gather
information--called sources and methods--are the most guarded secrets in
the business. They are put in "compartments," open only to those who must
know (termed "need to know") to do their work. The most tightly held
information would be a human spy deep in the heart of an enemy target. In
order to protect the source of the material and the means by which it was
gathered, its substance is frequently withheld because, officials
explain, to disclose what is known could give away the source.

Now intelligence experts have begun to wonder whether such
compartmentalization has gone too far. A senior intelligence official
said, for instance, that the problem was so irritating at the session for
Rumsfeld's Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States that one key analyst was given clearance "on the spot" to a
compartment previously barred to him so he could continue to participate.

For Rumsfeld, that briefing illustrated the little publicized but serious
problem that compartmentalization has created in the government. Highly
sensitive intelligence is so compartmentalized, Rumsfeld said during a
recent interview, that wrong information is sometimes being given to
policymakers because analysts do not have access to correct secret data.

The situation so concerned Rumsfeld that he included it as a major issue
in a classified report sent in March to Director of Central Intelligence
George J. Tenet. The former defense secretary said protected compartments
withheld from key analysts "can have the effect of seriously impeding the
flow of information, distorting
analyses and resulting in incomplete or misleading information being
presented to policymakers."

Rumsfeld said his concerns have brought a response. Already, he said,
"some limited numbers of people . . . are accessing compartments across
the board, rather than simply in their precise areas."

A senior intelligence official confirmed steps are being taken to loosen
the compartments, "but the solution must be a balance between access and
protection of sources and methods."

As an example taken from his experience, Rumsfeld said at the end of a
two-hour classified briefing on several countries' ballistic missiles and
other weapons, his group was told "that most of what we had heard was
incorrect." The reason, he said, was "the briefers did not have access to
the information contained in the compartments that we were now to be
briefed on."

The tight compartmentalization is an outgrowth of the 1994 discovery of
former CIA officer Aldrich H. Ames's nine years of spying for Moscow.
Ames was able to gather top-secret materials not only in the
counterintelligence areas in which he worked, but also in other sensitive
areas to which he could gain computer access.

"The extent to which the number of compartments balloon after a serious
espionage case is enormous," Rumsfeld said. Because a spy creates
enormous damage, the natural reaction is to install tighter control over
information, according to counterintelligence specialists. That problem
has added relevance today because of concern about security at the
nation's nuclear weapons laboratories.

Department of Energy security specialists, in the wake of evidence that
China has obtained secret information over the past 20 years, are now
seeking to limit scientists' traditionally wide access to classified
data. One step being considered is limiting access on each particular
part of a nuclear weapon on a need to know basis.

For Rumsfeld, this type of compartmentalization "limited access
absolutely to people with a need to know, and historically that meant
only people dealing with that particular country."

"We ended up getting briefed two or three or four times on the same
subject because from the first two or three we didn't get the correct
information, not because people were lying to us, but because they didn't
know," Rumsfeld said.

When the problem of missile and nuclear proliferation came along, it
harmed overall intelligence because "what is happening in one country
doesn't end there," he said. What one country does "will become of
interest in another country in short order, particularly countries like
Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea." He expressed the belief that because
"these countries are trading to the extent that they are . . . all across
the globe in a totally different region," the analyst would "see a quite
different picture if you are into all the compartments rather than if
you're into only the compartments that relate to precisely to what you're
dealing with."

His solution, which he passed on to Tenet, was, "we need to find a way to
do crosscutting, so a limited number of people are able to see what going
on in all these countries involved in proliferation."

For Rumsfeld and some others, compartmentalization also creates

At a recent talk on Capitol Hill, CIA official Robert Walpole illustrated
the point.

Walpole noted that the new intelligence estimate on foreign missile
capability will include data collected from private U.S. missile
corporations asked to analyze the potential growth in missile capability
for countries such as Iraq, North Korea and Iran. But, Walpole warned,
the analysis would be limited because there was not time to determine how
much detailed, country-by-country intelligence information could be
shared with the U.S. aerospace companies.

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End of DNI-NEWS Digest - 2 May 1999 to 6 May 1999